

The State, Religious Communities, and the Limits of Freedom: Applying the Risk-Resource Framework

Fatkhuri^{1*}, Ahmad Ali Nurdin², Fauzan Ali Rasyid³, Asep Abdul Sahid⁴

¹UPN Veteran, Jakarta, Indonesia

^{2,3,4} UIN Sunan Gunung Djati, Bandung, Indonesia

*Corresponding author: fatkhuri@upnvj.ac.id

Abstract: This study critically examines Indonesia's state strategy in managing religious organisations after the Reformasi, utilising Lundgren's (2022) risk-resource theoretical lens. In the complex Indonesian context, where state-religion relations are symbiotic rather than fully secular, the state actively frames and regulates religious communities by weighing their perceived social contributions against potential threats to Pancasila and national stability. Through qualitative comparative analysis on the disbandment of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), alongside partnerships with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, this research finds HTI and FPI are constructed as risks due to opposition to state ideology, involvement in public disorder, and challenges to the legitimacy of the national framework. Conversely, NU and Muhammadiyah are embraced as resources, owing to their roles in social services, promotion of moderate Islam, and reinforcement of state authority. This research concludes that such state policies have profound implications for religious freedom and Indonesia's democracy, recasting religious liberty as a negotiated and conditional space. While these policies may curb radicalism, they risk shrinking the space for civil society and blurring the boundaries between civil society and the state, thereby presenting significant challenges to democratic vitality and the protection of fundamental rights in the Indonesian context.

Keywords: State-religion relations, Resource-Risk Framework, Islam, Indonesia.

Introduction

Since the fall of the New Order in 1998, state-religion relations in Indonesia have evolved within a distinctively symbiotic configuration rather than a model of strict secular separation or formal theocracy. The state, grounded in Pancasila with its first principle of "Belief in the One and Only God", formally recognises and protects religion, while religious institutions—especially large Islamic mass organisations—lend moral legitimacy and social reach to state agendas. This reciprocal pattern was already visible under Soeharto, but in a highly controlled form. The post-Reformasi opening has transformed it into a more plural, yet also more contentious, arena in which the state must continuously manage competing Islamic projects and discursively define which actors count as legitimate partners and which as threats.

Historically, the New Order regime cultivated a tightly managed version of Islam. In the 1970s and 1980s, a modernist, development-oriented discourse dominated the public face of Indonesian Islam, broadly endorsing Pancasila as the sole national ideology and rejecting the idea of an Islamic state as unsuitable for Indonesia's plural society (Bruinessen, 2013a, pp. 1–3). Major organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) were gradually co-opted into this framework, accepting Pancasila and contributing to state projects in education, social welfare, and rural development. At the same time, Islamist opposition was contained through legal restrictions, surveillance, and selective repression, ensuring that the state remained the principal arbiter of acceptable Islamic expression (Bruinessen, 2013a).

The Reformasi era fundamentally altered this landscape. Democratisation, decentralisation, and expanded civil liberties enabled the proliferation of Islamic organisations across the ideological spectrum, including the rise of transnationally linked movements such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Salafi networks, and Jamaah Tabligh (Sebastian, 2019, pp. 5–7). Public religion became more visible and contested, with mass rallies, identity politics, regional sharia by-laws, and new forms of Islamic activism reshaping the political field. This diversification intensified pressures on the state to manage religious pluralism while preserving national cohesion, prompting a combination of legal innovation, security measures, and strategic alliances with established Islamic actors.

Classical debates in the study of state-religion relations often hinge on a binary between secularism and theocracy, presuming either sharp institutional separation or formal religious establishment. Talal Asad's critique of "the secular" as a specifically Western historical construct complicates this binary by showing how modern states—ostensibly secular or not—actively delimit and redefine religion through law, discipline, and discourse (Asad, 2003, pp. 16–18). Jocelyne Cesari similarly argues that political Islam is not best understood through doctrinal criteria. Still, through a movement's position vis-à-vis state power, those that challenge state authority are problematised, whereas those that support it can be nationalised and normalised (Cesari, 2018, pp. 25–27). Indonesia's experience fits uneasily into either secular or theocratic boxes, illustrating instead a hybrid regime in which the state openly engages with religion yet retains decisive control over the boundaries of legitimate Islam.

Indonesian scholars have captured this hybridity through the notion of a “symbiotic paradigm”. Herlius and Sitorus refine this by describing post-Reformasi state–religion relations as “mutual symbiosis”, in which Pancasila provides a shared ideological platform that allows cooperation without formalising an Islamic state, even as the state reserves the right to intervene when religious movements are seen to endanger national stability (Herlius & Sitorus, 2022, p. 445).

Against this backdrop, this article employs Linnea Lundgren’s resource–risk framework—originally developed to analyse the governance of religious minorities in Sweden—to examine how the Indonesian state classifies and manages four key Islamic actors: HTI, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), NU, and Muhammadiyah. Lundgren conceptualises modern states as assessing religious communities along a continuum from “resources” that contribute to welfare, social cohesion, and ideological legitimacy, to “risks” that threaten individual rights, public order, or foundational norms such as gender equality and democracy (Lundgren, 2023, pp. 15–21). Adapting this lens to a Muslim-majority, non-secular democracy allows a systematic comparison of how Indonesia has dissolved HTI and FPI as threats to Pancasila and public order, while embracing NU and Muhammadiyah as strategic partners in governance, welfare provision, and religious moderation.

Empirically, the article offers a comparative reading of these four organisations under a single analytical framework, tracing how their ideological profiles, repertoires of action, and institutional embeddedness shape state perceptions of their resource value and risk potential. Theoretically, it extends Lundgren’s model beyond the European minority context to illuminate how a post-authoritarian Muslim-majority state operationalises similar logics of governed religion in managing intra-Islamic diversity and transnational Islamist currents. Normatively, the study interrogates the implications of this selective governance for religious freedom, freedom of association, and the broader democratic public sphere: it asks to what extent the suppression of HTI and FPI and the deepening co-optation of NU and Muhammadiyah protect democratic order, and to what extent they entrench a hierarchical, state-curated religious mainstream that narrows civil space.

Theoretical Framework

1. Governance of Religion and Governed Religion

Lundgren analyses Sweden’s governance of religious diversity over seventy years and introduces the notion of “governed religion”: religion as it is constructed, enabled, and constrained by state laws, policies, and bureaucratic practices. Her study traces three main policy fields—religion–state relations, education, and integration—and within each she identifies three historical phases: a phase of deliberation (1950s–1960s), a phase of recognition and silence (1970s–1980s), and a phase of regulation and civic religion (1990s–2020s) (Lundgren, 2023). In the deliberation phase, the state primarily discussed how to handle religious minorities but enacted few concrete reforms; in the recognition phase, minorities were granted financial support and formal equality while religion was largely confined to the private sphere; in the regulation/civic religion phase, religious communities were simultaneously invited into welfare provision and subject to tighter regulation.

Across these phases, Lundgren argues that the state increasingly evaluated religious communities through a risk–resource lens. Religion is framed as a resource when it helps the state achieve goals such as social cohesion, welfare provision, and moral legitimation; it is framed as a risk when it appears to threaten individual autonomy, gender equality, liberal-democratic norms, or societal integration (Lundgren, 2023). Good religion in this sense is that which supports civic values, offers complementary welfare services, and aligns with the state’s vision of a plural yet cohesive society; bad religion is that which fosters closed “narrow communities”, segregated schooling, or illiberal internal norms that undermine the rights of women, children, and sexual minorities. Thus, governed religion is not simply any religion under a neutral legal regime, but religion that is actively sorted, incentivised, or constrained according to its perceived contribution to or threat against state projects.

Lundgren’s framework is particularly useful for this article because it moves beyond doctrinal debates to focus on the pragmatic rationalities of state actors. It offers categories—resource and risk—that can be operationalised in empirical analysis, and it highlights the inherently political nature of state assessments of religious communities. Adapting this to Indonesia allows us to ask not only whether HTI or FPI are “radical” and NU or Muhammadiyah “moderate”, but how and why the state codifies some actors as resources and others as risks within a symbiotic order.

2. Resource and Risk in the Indonesian Context

Building on Lundgren, this article defines resource and risk categories in terms tailored to Indonesia’s Pancasila-based, Muslim-majority polity. Lundgren identifies religion as a resource when it offers ideological legitimisation, fills welfare gaps, generates social capital, and assists in crisis management (Lundgren, 2023). In Indonesia, these functions correspond to four key dimensions, as described below.

First, ideological legitimation. It is organisations that explicitly affirm Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and NKRI, and that propagate narratives of Islam as compatible with democracy and pluralism, are valuable in

sustaining state legitimacy in a religious society. Second, welfare provision: actors such as NU and Muhammadiyah that operate schools, universities, hospitals, and social services complement the state's limited welfare capacity and are thus instrumental for developmental and social policy goals. Third, social capital and cohesion: Broad-based organisations that can mobilise communities for peaceful participation, conflict resolution, and intergroup dialogue contribute to social stability and are assets in a fragmented polity. Fourth, crisis response: religious networks with nationwide reach can be rapidly mobilised in times of natural disaster, pandemic, or political crisis, making them important partners in national resilience.

Conversely, religion is treated as a risk when it is perceived to undermine core state interests. In the Indonesian setting, four risk dimensions are salient: First, ideological subversion of Pancasila/NKRI: movements such as HTI that promote an alternative sovereignty project (e.g. global caliphate) are classified as fundamental threats to the constitutional order, regardless of their tactics. Second, vigilante violence and public-order disruption: organisations like FPI, whose repertoire includes raids, intimidation, and extra-legal enforcement, are seen as undermining the state's monopoly on coercion and eroding trust in legal institutions. Third, erosion of individual rights and minority protections: groups that advocate or practise coercive conformity, sectarian hostility, or systematic discrimination against minorities are perceived as endangering the liberal elements of Indonesia's constitutional democracy, even when tolerated at the margins. Fourth, potential for radicalisation and transnational linkages: organisations with strong ties to global jihadist or extremist networks, or those rhetorically legitimising violence, are treated as security risks justifying preventive interventions (Sebastian, 2019).

Under this framework, NU and Muhammadiyah are high on resource dimensions and relatively low on risk, whereas HTI and FPI are the inverse, which helps explain their divergent treatment by the state.

To operationalise this framework in the comparative analysis of HTI, FPI, NU and Muhammadiyah, the article employs four key analytical variables derived from the above theories:

First, ideological alignment with Pancasila. The degree to which each organisation affirms or challenges Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and NKRI as the final political framework. This variable captures the ideological risk dimension highlighted by both Lundgren's "governed religion" (Lundgren, 2023) and Cesari's "national Islam" versus deviant currents (Cesari, 2018). Second, attitude to democracy and constitutional order. Whether the organisation participates in electoral politics, accepts democratic procedures, and uses constitutional avenues for change, or instead advocates extra-constitutional alternatives. Third, repertoire of contentious actions. The dominant modes of political action: peaceful *dakwah*, lobbying and negotiation, litigation, mass demonstrations, or vigilantism and violence. This variable is central for distinguishing HTI's primarily discursive challenge from FPI's street-level disruption, and for contrasting them with NU and Muhammadiyah's institutional and advocacy-oriented repertoires.

Fourth, organisational embeddedness in state projects. Extent of formal and informal partnership with the state: participation in advisory bodies (e.g. MUI, BPIP), reception of state funding, involvement in government programmes, and appointment of leaders to public office. High embeddedness increases resource value but also raises concerns about co-optation and reduced autonomy.

By integrating these variables within Lundgren's risk–resource matrix, the framework allows a nuanced, comparative account of how the Indonesian state constructs HTI and FPI as risks warranting dissolution, while institutionalising NU and Muhammadiyah as indispensable but increasingly managed resources within a symbiotic political-religious order.

Method

Methodologically, the research adopts a qualitative comparative case study design. It analyses official legal and policy documents, including the 2017 Government Regulation (Perppu) on mass organisations and the 2020 joint decree banning FPI, alongside secondary literature on political Islam, state–religion relations, and Islamic organisations in Indonesia. Discourse analysis is employed to reconstruct how state actors frame each organisation as a resource or risk, while situating these framings within wider shifts in Indonesian Islam and global debates on the governance of religion. Through this approach, the article aims to contribute both to empirical understanding of Indonesia's evolving Islam–state nexus and to comparative theorisation of how contemporary states manage religious pluralism under conditions of democratic contestation.

The theoretical framework for this article combines Lundgren's concept of governed religion with critical perspectives on secular power and political Islam, and with Indonesian debates on symbiotic state–Islam relations. Together, these lenses allow a systematic reading of how the Indonesian state perceives and manages HTI, FPI, NU and Muhammadiyah as either resources or risks to national order.

Results and Discussion

1. HTI as Ideological Risk

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) represents a paradigmatic case of what this article terms an ideological risk. Organizationally, HTI is part of the global Hizb ut-Tahrir network that advocates the re-establishment of a single transnational *khilafah* as the only legitimate political order for Muslims, rejecting the nation-state system as inherently illegitimate. HTI is identified as an Islamist organisation. Its ultimate purpose is to establish a new caliphate that would unite the entire Muslim world under its banner (Bruinessen, 2013b, p. 38). The institutionalisation of these Islamic values is seen by some scholars as potentially eroding democratic values (Bagir, and Fachrudin, 2020, pp. 150–151).

In Indonesia, HTI consistently refused to participate in elections or form a party; instead, it prioritised *tatsqif* (cadre education) and *ta'thir* (influencing public opinion) through campus-based circles, high-profile conferences, and mass rallies, seeking to gradually win over intellectuals, students, and segments of the bureaucracy (Arifianto, 2020, pp. 117–118). Bruinessen maps HTI alongside PKS, Salafi and Tablighi currents as part of a new generation of transnational Islamic movements that increasingly compete with NU and Muhammadiyah in shaping the terms of Islamic discourse and activism in post-Soeharto Indonesia (Bruinessen, 2013a). Ricklefs observes the growing influence of HTI in regions such as Kediri, noting its infiltration into mainstream Islamic organisations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). He argues that HTI's political aspiration for a universal caliphate fundamentally contradicts NU's perspective that the Republic of Indonesia represents the final and legitimate political form for the archipelago, thereby positioning HTI as a potential threat to Indonesia's national integrity (Ricklefs, 2008, pp. 129–130). This concern aligns with discussions by White and Anshor, who highlight how radical Islamic groups, including HTI, actively led street demonstrations supporting the draft anti-pornography law. Critics of this legislation contended that such movements—along with HTI's involvement—risk undermining democratic values and the philosophical foundation of Pancasila, as well as the national motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* enshrined in the 1945 Constitution (White, Sally & Anshor, 2008, pp. 154–155).

From the state's perspective, HTI's primary offence is not violent action but its overt rejection of Indonesia's foundational consensus. Official statements around the time of its dissolution repeatedly characterised HTI's agenda as incompatible with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and as endangering the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) (Herdiansah et.al, 2023, pp. 240–241). Government spokespeople framed the caliphate project as an attempt to replace the existing state structure rather than merely criticize specific policies, casting HTI as a direct ideological challenger to national sovereignty. Crucially, this framing emphasised intent and doctrinal orientation rather than empirical evidence of terrorism or armed rebellion: HTI was depicted as undermining the legitimacy of the nation-state and therefore as a latent threat that had to be neutralised before it could manifest in more disruptive forms. The regulation to disband HTI was achieved by amending legal procedures and expanding the definition of ideologies that contravened Pancasila (Bagir and Fachrudin, 2020).

The key legal instrument used was Perppu Ormas No. 2 of 2017, which amended the law on mass organisations. This regulation empowered the executive to revoke the legal status of organisations deemed to violate Pancasila or threaten national security, without the need for a prior court ruling (Ubaidillah & Syalafiyah, 2025, p. 149). The HTI case thus illustrates a shift from a reactive model—where the state prosecutes specific offences—to a preventive security logic in which perceived ideological dangers justify exceptional measures aimed at pre-empting potential subversion (Arifianto, 2020).

Viewed through Lundgren's risk–resource framework, HTI has negligible resource value for the Indonesian state but a high perceived ideological cost. HTI does not run schools, hospitals, or large-scale welfare institutions, nor does it command significant electoral support or help the state implement social policies; its organisational energy is invested mainly in ideological mobilisation and public advocacy for the caliphate. In terms of resource dimensions—welfare provision, social capital for cohesion, crisis response—HTI offers almost no direct contribution to state objectives. By contrast, its stated goal of replacing the nation-state order with a transnational caliphate directly challenges the Pancasila-based constitutional framework, positioning HTI as an alternative source of political sovereignty. Under such conditions, the state's risk calculus effectively sees a movement with near-zero utility and maximal ideological risk, making dissolution an attractive option within the logic of governed religion (Lundgren, 2023).

Scholarly evaluations of the government's decision to ban Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) reveal persistent tensions between the pursuit of ideological security and the protection of democratic freedoms. Some commentators interpret the dissolution of HTI as an application of the “militant democracy” doctrine, which allows democratic states to restrict organisations that seek to undermine constitutional order. From this standpoint, permitting HTI to operate without constraints would risk legitimising anti-system discourses and weakening public commitment to Pancasila. In contrast, other scholars warn that the use of expansive ideological justifications and executive authority poses serious risks to civil liberties. Cited by Arifianto (2020), Marcus Mietzner of the Australian National University has been particularly critical of the government's decision to limit

the freedom of expression of groups such as HTI by circumventing judicial procedures stipulated under Law No. 17/2013 on civil-society organisations. This legislation, which originally required court involvement in organisational bans, was swiftly repealed and replaced with an emergency regulation granting the executive branch the power to dissolve organisations alleged to violate Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution without adequate legal safeguards (Arifianto, 2020).

In risk–resource terms, the HTI case illustrates how the state’s prioritisation of ideological security can elevate perceived political risk to a level that legitimizes the use of extraordinary and discretionary power. By framing HTI primarily as an existential threat to Pancasila and the constitutional order, the government was able to mobilise coercive instruments that bypassed ordinary legal safeguards and curtailed fundamental civil liberties, particularly freedom of association and expression. While such measures may deliver short-term stability and signal state resolve, they also recalibrate the balance between security and rights in ways that normalise executive overreach. Over time, these dynamic risks weakening the democratic public sphere by narrowing the space for dissent, fostering self-censorship among civil society actors, and eroding public trust in legal institutions as neutral arbiters of political conflict.

2. FPI as Public-Order Risk

If HTI exemplifies an ideological risk, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) embodies a public-order risk. Established in the late 1990s, FPI presented itself as a defender of Islam, morality, and the umma, and became widely known for its “sweeping” actions against venues and activities it labelled immoral, such as nightclubs, bars, and events involving alcohol or what it considered indecency (Feillard, A., & Madinier, 2011, pp. 140–147). Its repertoire combined mass demonstrations, intimidation, and sometimes physical attacks, which leaders often justified as necessary to uphold Islamic morals where the state was seen as lax or complicit. (White, Sally & Anshor, 2008) Hefner describes the growth of such groups as “uncivil Islam” and a threat to Indonesia’s pluralist Islamic culture (Fealy, Greg and White, 2008, p. 1) While FPI framed its activities as religiously mandated policing of vice, many scholars and human-rights advocates interpret these tactics as a form of vigilantism that undermines the rule of law and enables mob justice in place of formal legal processes (Feillard, A., & Madinier, 2011).

Over two decades, FPI developed a long record of involvement in violent confrontations with religious minorities, leftist groups, and entertainment businesses, as well as in attacks on events deemed blasphemous or anti-Islam. Feillard and Madinier document repeated incidents in which FPI cadres engaged in property damage and assaults under the banner of anti-vice campaigns, often in the presence of, or with limited resistance from, local police (Feillard, A., & Madinier, 2011). The 2020 joint decree banning FPI cited data showing that over 200 FPI members or leaders had been prosecuted for various criminal offences, including some linked to terrorism, with a substantial proportion receiving convictions; these figures were used to construct a narrative of systematic law-breaking rather than isolated excesses. This pattern of cumulative incidents strengthened the state’s claim that FPI posed a sustained and unacceptable threat to public order.

The 2020 joint decree (SKB) was notable not only for its content but also for its form. It was issued by six different high-level state institutions—encompassing ministries and security agencies—which signalled a broad elite consensus that FPI’s continued existence was intolerable. The SKB’s justification wove together three strands of reasoning: security (references to terrorism links among some members), public order (extensive record of vigilantism, violence, and intimidation), and administrative legality (the claim that FPI’s organisational registration had lapsed and not been renewed) (Farisa, Fitria Chusna & Prabowo, 2020). By combining these elements, the decree framed FPI not merely as an ideological opponent but as an unlawful, dangerous organisation whose activities could no longer be accommodated within the legal framework of civil society associations.

From a risk–resource viewpoint, FPI’s repertoire of action directly challenges what Weber saw as a core marker of the state: the monopoly on legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. By organising raids, enforcing its own moral codes, and confronting perceived enemies on the streets, FPI effectively asserted a parallel claim to coercive authority, displacing the state’s formal institutions of policing and justice. Such behaviour scores extremely high on the “public-order risk” dimension in Lundgren’s framework: it generates fear among targeted communities, fosters cycles of retaliatory violence, and erodes public confidence that disputes will be handled through impartial legal processes rather than through force. In this calculus, FPI’s existence appears to threaten not the ideological foundations of Pancasila so much as the everyday functioning of legal order and societal cohesion.

At the same time, FPI’s role cannot be reduced solely to violent activism. As Sebastian and Nubowo note, the organisation also engaged in humanitarian work, including disaster relief, food distribution, and charity campaigns, especially during major calamities and Ramadan (Sebastian, 2019). These activities allowed FPI to cultivate a base of popular support in some urban poor communities, where state services were often lacking, and to present itself as a protector and benefactor rather than merely a mob organisation. In Lundgren’s terms, FPI thus possessed some resource attributes: it could mobilise volunteers quickly, had strong networks in certain neighbourhoods, and at times filled welfare gaps that state institutions struggled to address.

However, the state ultimately judged that these limited resource aspects were outweighed by the significant public-order costs. The SKB's language emphasised the cumulative harms of FPI's vigilantism, the legal burdens caused by repeated criminal cases, and the risk of future unrest if the group continued to operate. From the vantage point of governed religion, FPI's combination of moral policing and selective humanitarianism did not align with the state's ideal of good religion that supports welfare and civic values without usurping coercive functions. Instead, its actions were seen as fostering polarisation, legitimising extra-legal violence, and complicating the state's efforts to project itself as the sole guardian of public order.

The scholarly debate around FPI's dissolution is therefore somewhat different from that on HTI. While concerns about freedom of association and expression remain, many analysts concede that FPI's repeated, visible breaches of the law provide a more concrete basis for state intervention than in the HTI case. Critics nevertheless warn that relying on broad security and morality narratives, rather than consistently prosecuting individual offences through ordinary courts, risks normalising extra-judicial approaches to unwanted organisations and could be extended to other, less violent critics of the government. Overall, reading FPI as a public-order risk complements the interpretation of HTI as an ideological risk: together, they illustrate how the Indonesian state conceptualises and responds to distinct types of perceived threat, using the tools of law and security policy to curate the religious landscape in line with its understanding of stability and legitimate public religion.

3. NU and Muhammadiyah as a Resource

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are the two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia and key pillars of moderate Islam. NU, founded in 1926 and rooted in rural, traditional Sunni communities, and Muhammadiyah, established in 1912 with a predominantly urban and modernist base, together command tens of millions of members and extensive networks of educational and social welfare institutions. Both organisations possess significant moral authority through internationally respected, inclusive Islamic scholars. Consistently, NU and Muhammadiyah have opposed radicalism and promoted a pluralist vision of Islam that supports religious diversity and Indonesia's model of religious nationalism (Jamhari & Testriono, 2021, p. 531).

NU and Muhammadiyah occupy a central position in the Indonesian state's resource-risk calculus. Both are not only religious actors but also social institutions that have historically contributed to ideological legitimacy, welfare provision, and the moderation of Islamic discourse, so they are constructed as "resources" that must be maintained within the symbiotic configuration of state-religion relations.

Historically, NU and Muhammadiyah have been at the heart of constructing a "national Islam" compatible with the nation-state. NU, which initially stood in a constellation of rivalry with Masyumi, moved from a position of opposition towards the acceptance of Pancasila and the republic, especially from the end of the Sukarno era and under the New Order. A crucial step was the 1984 NU congress decision to accept Pancasila as the sole foundation, which simultaneously affirmed NU's commitment to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and abandoned aspirations for a formal Islamic state. This made NU a key state partner in stabilising Islam-state relations. The leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) then solidified NU's image as a pluralist force that defended minority rights and democracy, further enhancing NU's symbolic value as a pillar of regime legitimacy in the post-Suharto era.

Muhammadiyah followed a distinct yet convergent trajectory in shaping Indonesian Islam. Since the early twentieth century, the organisation has advanced a modernist *da'wa* that emphasises doctrinal purification and the rejection of syncretistic practices, while simultaneously embracing modern science, rational inquiry, and effective social organisation. Millie describes Muhammadiyah as a non-government organization dedicated to social advancement, noting its vast infrastructure of schools, hospitals, and orphanages (Millie, 2008, pp. 83–84). Education has been its principal instrument of reform, reflected in its long-standing commitment to modern learning, including the natural and applied sciences. Today, Muhammadiyah manages an extensive educational and health-care network, comprising thousands of schools, hundreds of higher education institutions, and several dozen universities; notably, some of Indonesia's leading private universities and teaching hospitals are operated by the organisation.

Through this reformist orientation, Muhammadiyah has fostered a strong culture of professional management, social entrepreneurship, public service, and organisational discipline (Barton, 2014, p. 297). In the contemporary era, the slogan Progressive Islam (*Islam Berkemajuan*) articulates this stance: an Islam that is rational, modern, and pro-progress, presented as fully compatible with Pancasila and democracy.

Thus, historically, both NU and Muhammadiyah have consolidated their positions as central Islamic pillars compatible with Pancasila, explicitly rejecting the project of a formal Islamic state and instead endorsing the constitutional framework of the Republic. Through this orientation, NU has articulated the discourse of *Islam Nusantara*, which emphasises the accommodation of Islamic teachings with local cultures, pluralism, and historical continuity, while Muhammadiyah has advanced the notion of *Islam Berkemajuan* (Progressive Islam), foregrounding rationality, social reform, and engagement with modernity. Together, these paradigms function not merely as theological orientations but as socio-political projects that provide normative foundations for a nationally rooted, moderate Islam. In doing so, NU and Muhammadiyah have played a decisive role in legitimising

religious nationalism in Indonesia, stabilising Islam–state relations, and positioning Indonesian Islam as both religiously authoritative and politically compatible with a plural, democratic nation-state.

4. Welfare Institutions and Social Functions

The main strength of NU and Muhammadiyah as resources lies in the scale and depth of their welfare institutions. Muhammadiyah manages a large network of educational institutions—from kindergartens to universities—as well as hundreds of hospitals, clinics, and orphanages. Official data indicate that Muhammadiyah manages 172 higher education institutions, consisting of 83 universities, 53 higher schools (*sekolah tinggi*), and 36 institutions in other forms, alongside 5,345 schools or madrasahs and 440 pesantren across Indonesia (Tempo.co, 2023). NU, although its welfare work is more decentralised, has thousands of pesantren, madrasah diniyah, and formal schools, as well as hospitals and zakat institutions connected to grassroots kiai networks. According to statements by NU Chairman Yahya Cholil Staquf (Gus Yahya), NU currently oversees approximately 13,000 early childhood education institutions (PAUD), around 26,000 pesantren, and about 15,000 schools and madrasahs, in addition to hundreds of other educational institutions within the NU ecosystem. These institutions have largely emerged from *khidmah* (service) and the independent initiatives of nahdliyin communities rather than through centralised organisational planning (Attar, 2025).

Beyond routine services, both organisations play important roles in disaster response and social safety nets. Through bodies such as Lazismu and LAZISNU, they channel zakat, donations, and charity into food assistance, scholarships, economic empowerment, and support for displaced people, including in refugee crises and the COVID-19 pandemic. In Lundgren’s framework, these functions directly represent religion as a complementary welfare provider: the state encourages and partners with religious actors to fill gaps in its own welfare capacity while drawing moral legitimacy from their humanitarian work.

From the state’s point of view, therefore, NU and Muhammadiyah possess exceptionally high resource value. Through their vast networks of educational, health, and welfare institutions, these organisations significantly reduce the state’s fiscal and administrative burdens by providing essential public services that would otherwise require substantial government expenditure and bureaucratic capacity. Their extensive grassroots presence enables the state to extend the reach of social services into rural and urban communities that are often difficult to access through formal state mechanisms alone. Moreover, visible collaboration with NU and Muhammadiyah enhances the image of the state as socially responsive and morally grounded, as these organisations enjoy high levels of public trust and religious legitimacy. In this sense, partnership with NU and Muhammadiyah functions not only as a strategy of service delivery but also as a key mechanism through which the state reinforces its social legitimacy and governance capacity.

5. Moderation and deradicalisation

At the discursive level, NU and Muhammadiyah also occupy leading roles in the religious moderation project that has become a formal state agenda. NU has formulated the concept of *Islam Nusantara*, emphasising Islam rooted in local culture, tolerant, and opposed to violence; this concept is promoted nationally as an antithesis to rigid transnational ideologies. NU consistently upholds the principle that Islam does not endorse violence. Unlike Salafi groups that interpret jihad primarily as warfare, NU understands jihad as earnest effort and hard work in pursuing the common good, including combating ignorance, poverty, corruption, and other forms of injustice. Through the concept of *Islam Nusantara*, NU also embraces local culture, promoting tolerance not only toward religious minorities but also toward culturally rooted religious practices within Indonesian Islam (Rochmawati, 2024, p. 380).

This discursive initiative gained significant political backing during the Jokowi presidency, particularly as the administration faced increasing pressure from conservative Islamist actors and questions regarding the president’s Islamic credentials. In the aftermath of the 2016 *Aksi Bela Islam* mobilisations against Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama—which culminated in his electoral defeat and subsequent blasphemy conviction, Jokowi increasingly aligned himself with NU. Within this context, the president repeatedly endorsed *Islam Nusantara* in NU-affiliated forums as an Islamic orientation fully compatible with Pancasila and Indonesia’s national ideology, thereby reinforcing NU’s discursive prominence in the state’s strategy for managing ideological contestation (Arifianto, 2021b).

Alongside its articulation of *Islam Berkemajuan* (Progressive Islam), Muhammadiyah reaffirmed its commitment to the Indonesian nation-state during its 2015 *Muktamar* by explicitly endorsing Pancasila and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The organisation declared Pancasila to be both a national consensus (*dar al-‘ahdi*) and a collective moral commitment (*dar al-syahadah*) aimed at realising a peaceful and secure society (*dar al-salam*) (Arifianto, 2024, p. 349). While acknowledging that Pancasila is not a religious doctrine, Muhammadiyah asserted that its foundational principles are fully compatible with Islamic teachings and values. Through these doctrinal positions, Muhammadiyah clearly rejected Islamist projects advocating the establishment of an Islamic state or a global caliphate, particularly those advanced by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

(HTI).

Within this framework, *Islam Berkemajuan*—rooted in Muhammadiyah’s long-standing *tajdid* (renewal) tradition—advances an interpretation of Islam that prioritises rationality, social justice, and openness to modern knowledge. This perspective conceptualises Islam not merely as a belief system, but as a moral and intellectual resource for responding to contemporary societal challenges such as inequality, education, and public welfare. As Husain observes, this paradigm closely aligns with the state’s official discourse of religious moderation, especially its emphasis on tolerance, civic responsibility, and opposition to extremism. As a result, Muhammadiyah has increasingly been incorporated into state-led initiatives, including the formulation of religious education curricula and participation in anti-radicalisation and counter-extremism programmes, (Saat, 2020, pp. 120–121) thereby positioning the organisation as both a key normative reference and an institutional partner in the state’s broader strategy for governing religious diversity and managing ideological risk (Husain, 2025, pp. 40–41).

In Lundgren’s terms, this dynamic further consolidates NU and Muhammadiyah’s position as ideological resources for the state. By articulating authoritative interpretations of Islam that emphasise moderation, tolerance, and constitutional loyalty, these organisations supply the religious legitimisation necessary for state-led moderation agendas to gain credibility among Muslim constituencies. At the same time, their discourses function as powerful narrative shields, enabling the state to counter the claims of groups such as HTI or FPI not merely through coercive regulation, but through the mobilisation of alternative Islamic authorities and meanings. Rather than appearing as a secular imposition on religion, state policies are thus reframed as aligned with “authentic” Islamic values, reducing the resonance of oppositional Islamist narratives and lowering the political risks associated with governing religious diversity.

6. Patronage and Co-optation

However, the strategic value of NU and Muhammadiyah as sources of religious legitimacy and social stability also exposes them to patterns of patronage and elite co-optation. Under Jokowi, NU and Muhammadiyah have entered a qualitatively new phase of incorporation into state power, marked by dense patronage ties rather than arm’s-length cooperation (Arifianto; Alexander R., 2024). Arifianto shows that Jokowi’s alignment with NU—initially to counter hardline Islamists after the 2016–17 “Defending Islam” mobilisation—was rewarded with an unprecedented bundle of political appointments, regulatory influence, and targeted material benefits (Arifianto, 2021a, pp. 5–8). This pattern is visible in the appointment of NU-linked figures to strategic posts such as Vice President Ma’ruf Amin, Minister of Religious Affairs Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, and other ministerial and bureaucratic positions, while Muhammadiyah representatives have been comparatively underrepresented in Jokowi’s cabinets. Beyond cabinet posts, NU in particular has benefited from legislation and policy instruments tailored to organisational interests, such as the 2019 pesantren law, expanded subsidies for NU-affiliated schools and universities, and access to state-backed credit schemes and grant programs.

From a resource-risk perspective, the Indonesian state under Jokowi has strong incentives to sustain NU and Muhammadiyah as reliable sources of religious legitimacy and social stability, treating them as strategic assets amid threats from Islamist challengers. This positioning, however, fosters financial dependencies through budgetary support, mining concessions, and development grants, alongside political dependencies via cabinet appointments and regulatory favours, which erode organisational autonomy. The state views NU and Muhammadiyah as low-risk partners capable of mobilising mass support, countering radicalism, and legitimising policies without demanding structural reforms. Arifianto highlights how Jokowi’s post-2017 alignment with NU—rewarded with disproportionate cabinet seats and pesantren funding—secured electoral victories while neutralising Islamist opposition (Arifianto, 2021a). Yet these ties create mutual vulnerabilities: organisations risk budget cuts or exclusion if they criticize the regime, as seen in Muhammadiyah’s reluctant acceptance of mining licenses after warnings of lost patronage.

7. Internal contestations and their effects

Within NU and Muhammadiyah, this status as major state partners interacts with longstanding tensions between conservative and progressive currents. Bruinessen notes that since the early 2000s, the “conservative turn” has appeared in the strengthening of conservative factions within both organisations, including through congress outcomes and leadership compositions that have sidelined liberal figures from key positions (Bruinessen, 2013a). Sebastian and Nubowo show that, amid intensifying identity politics—such as during the Ahok case—NU and Muhammadiyah have often faced dilemmas between maintaining a moderate, pluralist image and responding to conservative grassroots pressures more sympathetic to Islamist populism (Sebastian, 2019).

Close ties with the state can strengthen conservative bureaucratic factions inside these organisations. Elites most easily accommodated by the state tend to be those emphasising stability, avoidance of open conflict, and safe moderation rhetoric, whereas more critical progressive intellectuals can be marginalised in formal structures if they challenge state policies or majority intolerance too sharply. Consequently, internal pluralism and the capacity of these organisations to correct state policy—for example, on Ahmadiyah, Shia, or Christian

minorities—may be reduced, even while they continue to be publicly labelled as moderate.

In Lundgren’s framework, NU and Muhammadiyah are therefore not passive resources, but contested arenas in which the state, organisational elites, and members continually renegotiate the boundaries of moderation, tolerance, and critique. The state has a strong interest in maintaining them as strategic resources, but the forms of support and co-optation employed can reinforce conservative tendencies and weaken critical voices that are essential for the vitality of democracy and the protection of minority rights in Indonesia.

8. Implications for Religious Freedom and Democracy

The implications of Indonesia’s selective state management of religion are profound for religious freedom and democratic health, revealing a shrinking civil space and complex effects on pluralism. The use of broad legal instruments such as Perppu Ormas and the joint ministerial decree (SKB) banning FPI resonates with global debates on militant democracy, where liberal systems adopt defensive measures to protect themselves against actors deemed anti-system or illiberal. While these tools effectively target groups like HTI and FPI, their categorical phrasing—such as labelling organisations “against Pancasila” or causing “public order disturbance”—creates a legal matrix easily repurposed against other social or religious groups. This vagueness introduces risks of legal arbitrariness, risking the suppression of legitimate dissent and broadening the scope of state intervention beyond initially intended targets.

The differential treatment of Islamic organisations contributes to an institutionalised hierarchy of citizenship that distinguishes good Muslims, embodied by state-partnered organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah, from bad Muslims, including HTI, FPI, and other marginalised or dissenting movements. Such legal and political privileging risks undermining the egalitarian spirit of democratic citizenship, fostering exclusion and reinforcing sectarian divides. It effectively narrows the religious field permissible for political participation and civil engagement, fostering societal polarisation.

At the same time, the resource roles of NU and Muhammadiyah produce ambivalent outcomes for pluralism. On one hand, their extensive welfare services, ideological alignment with Pancasila, and active moderation efforts stabilise interreligious relations and are instrumental in countering violent extremism. Their grassroots networks and legitimising capacity help contain radical elements and provide social cohesion in a religiously plural society. However, their closer entanglement with state power, especially through patronage under the current administration, risks tempering their willingness or institutional capacity to defend marginalized groups, including Ahmadiyah, Shia Muslims, and religious minorities like Christians, particularly when such defense conflicts with state or conservative political pressures. This dynamic can lead to reduced pluralistic tolerance and a narrowing of the space for minority religious identities within the officially sanctioned Islamic mainstream.

Normatively, this complex picture reflects a tension or trade-off between security and freedom. While suppressing groups deemed anti-state or extremist may be necessary for preserving national stability and democratic order, relying on broad, vague legal categories and marginalising key civil society actors’ risks undermining democratic freedoms and civil liberties. To address these challenges, clearer legal safeguards must be established, including more rigorous judicial review mechanisms to prevent arbitrary application of security laws. Moreover, internal democratization within NU and Muhammadiyah is crucial to strengthen their independence and pluralistic commitments, empowering them to be robust civil society actors capable of advocating minority rights and challenging state overreach when necessary. Only by balancing security with genuine respect for plurality and religious freedom can Indonesia’s democracy fully consolidate its ideals in a multifaceted religious society.

Table 1. Findings Based on Lundgren’s Resource–Risk Framework

Dimension	HTI	FPI	NU	Muhammadiyah
Core state framing	Ideological risk (anti-Pancasila, pro-khilafah)	Public-order risk (vigilantism, lawlessness)	Strategic resource (traditionalist guardian of Pancasila)	Strategic resource (modernist supporter of nation-state)
Ideological alignment with Pancasila	Rejects Pancasila and NKRI as the final framework; promotes a transnational caliphate	Formally claims loyalty but practices often undermine the constitutional order via extra-legal enforcement	Explicitly affirms Pancasila; 1984 acceptance as sole foundation and Gus Dur’s pluralist legacy.	Affirms Pancasila and NKRI; <i>Islam Berkemajuan</i> is framed as compatible with democracy and the nation-state

Contribution to welfare & services (resource dimension)	Minimal: limited social service infrastructure; focus on ideological mobilisation	Limited, though some charity and disaster relief work in certain communities	Extensive <i>pesantren</i> , madrasah, social and health institutions across regions	Very extensive: 170+ universities, 450+ hospitals/clinics, thousands of schools and social programmes
Repertoire of action	Non-electoral da'wa, cadre training, mass rallies, ideological campaigns; no major violent record	Sweeps, raids, intimidation, street violence, mass protests framed as “moral enforcement”	Institutional da'wa, education, advocacy, participation in formal politics and policy forums	Institutional da'wa, education, advocacy, participation in formal politics and policy forums
Type of risk in Lundgren's terms	Ideological: an alternative sovereignty project challenging constitutional foundation	Public-order: erosion of state monopoly on coercion, recurrent criminal incidents	Low risk: generally, supports state order, though internal conservatives may resist some pluralist agendas	Low risk: supports constitutional order, though internal debates exist over social conservatism vs progressivism
State legal response	Dissolution via <i>Perppu Ormas</i> 2/2017; administrative ban justified by anti-Pancasila doctrine	Dissolution via 2020 SKB of multiple agencies; justified by criminal record, terrorism links, and expired registration	Institutionalised partnership; inclusion in councils, access to state programmes and funding.	Institutionalised partnership; inclusion in policy processes, access to state programmes and funding.
Role in state moderation/deradicalisation	Framed as a target of deradicalisation and ideological containment.	Framed as a target of law-and-order and de-vigilantisation campaigns.	Key partner in the moderation agenda (<i>Islam Nusantara</i> , <i>BNPT</i> & <i>Kemenag</i> programmes).	Key partner in the moderation agenda (<i>Islam Berkemajuan</i> , education reform, <i>BNPT</i> & <i>Kemenag</i> collaboration).
Overall position in the resource–risk spectrum	Near-zero resource value, maximal perceived ideological risk	Limited resource value is overshadowed by high public-order risk	High multi-dimensional resource value, low formal risk. Co-opted and elevated as “good Islam”	Very high resource value, low formal risk. Co-opted and elevated as “good Islam”

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that the post-Reformasi Indonesian state actively governs Islamic organisations through a resource-risk calculus within a symbiotic state-religion order, dissolving Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) as ideological and public-order risks while cultivating Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah as high-value resources for welfare provision, ideological legitimisation, and religious moderation. Drawing on Lundgren's framework, it reveals how the state—despite its non-secular constitution—employs legal instruments like *Perppu Ormas* and the FPI ban decree to categorise actors based on their perceived contributions to or threats against Pancasila, national cohesion, and sovereign authority, producing a curated religious field that privileges compliant mass organisations over challengers.

Applying Lundgren's originally European model of governed religion to Indonesia enriches global debates by showing how a Muslim-majority, post-authoritarian democracy operationalises similar pragmatic logics of risk and resource amid intra-religious diversity and transnational Islamist pressures. Where Lundgren analyses minority regulation in welfare states, this case illustrates majority-religion management in a symbiotic regime, where "good" Islam stabilises the polity through services and narratives while "bad" Islam is preemptively marginalised via administrative and security tools.

These findings carry significant implications for religious freedom and democratic consolidation, highlighting trade-offs where short-term stability achieved through repression and co-optation risks long-term contraction of civil space and weakened pluralism. Future research should pursue three directions. First, extend the framework to non-Muslim communities (e.g. Christians, Hindus) and intra-Muslim minorities (Ahmadiyah, Shia) to test whether similar resource-risk logics govern beyond Sunni-majority actors. Second, ethnographic studies of grassroots NU and Muhammadiyah constituencies could reveal how state patronage and moderation agendas are perceived, negotiated, or resisted at the local level, illuminating tensions between elite alignment and member agency. Third, comparative analysis with Malaysia (symbiotic Islam under UMNO-PAS dynamics), Turkey (AKP's national Islam project), or European cases (Sweden's minority governance) would clarify whether Indonesia's hybrid model is regionally distinctive or part of broader authoritarian-democratic trends in managing conservative religious mobilisations. By addressing these avenues, scholarship can further theorise governed religion in diverse polities, informing policies that balance security with robust freedoms of belief, association, and dissent essential to pluralistic democracy.

References

- Arifianto; Alexander R. (2024). *Clerics to coal miners: the decline of Indonesia's Islamic civil society*. New Mandala.
- Arifianto, A. R. (2020). *The State of Political Islam in Indonesia: The Historical Antecedent and Future Prospects*. 15(4), 111–132.
- Arifianto, A. R. (2021a). From ideological to political sectarianism : Nahdlatul Ulama , Muhammadiyah , and the state in Indonesia Muhammadiyah , and the state in Indonesia. *Religion, State & Society*, 00(00), 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1902247>
- Arifianto, A. R. (2021b). NAHDLATUL ULAMA AND ITS COMMITMENT TOWARDS MODERATE POLITICAL NORMS : A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ABDURRAHMAN WAHID. *Journal of Global Strategic Studies*, 1(1), 77–114.
- Arifianto, A. R. (2024). Moderate Islamic Organisations and Contestation Over Political Theology: The Responses by Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah Towards Islamism in Indonesia. In Gabriel Facal (Ed.), *NilssonThe Palgrave Handbook of Political Norms in Southeast Asia* (pp. 337–356). PALGRAVE MACMILLAN.
- Asad, T. (2003). *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford University Press.
- Attar, H. (2025). *Gus Yahya Sebut Lembaga Pendidikan di NU Lahir karena Khidmah dan Inisiatif Independen Warga Nahdliyin*. NUOnline.Com.
- Bagir, Zainal Abidin and Fachrudin, A. A. (2020). Democracy and the "Conservative Turn" in Indonesia. In Norshahril Saat & Azhar Ibrahim (Ed.), *Alternative voices in Muslim Southeast Asia : discourse & struggles* (pp. 139–155). ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Barton, G. (2014). The Gülen Movement , Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama : Progressive Islamic Thought , Religious Philanthropy and Civil Society in Turkey and Indonesia. *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 25(3), 287–301. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2014.916124>
- Bruinessen, M. van. (2013a). 1. Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam and the "Conservative Turn" of the Early Twenty-first Century. In M. van Bruinessen (Ed.), *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam Explaining the "Conservative Turn"* (1st ed., pp. 1–20). ISEAS Publishing.
- Bruinessen, M. van. (2013b). *Overview of Muslim Organisations, Associations and Movements in Indonesia* (M. van Bruinessen, Ed.; pp. 21–59). ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Cesari, J. (2018). *What is Political Islam?* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Farisa, Fitria Chusna & Prabowo, D. (2020, December). 6 Alasan Pemerintah Bubarkan dan Larang Kegiatan FPI. *Kompas.Com*.
- Fealy, Greg and White, S. (2008). Introduction. In Greg Fealy & Sally White (Ed.), *Expressing Islam: religious life and politics in Indonesia* (1). ISEAS Publishing.
- Feillard, A., & Madinier, R. (2011). *The End of Innocence? Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism*. Institut de recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine.
- Herdiansah et.all. (2023). BEYOND DISBANDMENT OF ISLAMIST ORGANIZATION: EXAMINING THE

- ADAPTIVE RESISTANCE OF HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA (HTI). *Jurnal Wacana Politik*, 8(2), 235–246. <https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v8i2.49870>
- Herlius, F., & Sitorus, D. (2022). *Perkembangan Relasi Negara dan Agama Paska Reformasi Konstitusi*. 5(3), 429–448. <https://doi.org/10.20473/mi.v5i3.36810>
- Husain, M. Z. (2025). Religious Moderation and the Development of Multicultural Societies in Indonesia : A Normative-Islamic Legal Study. *ASEAN Journal of Islamic Studies and Civilization (AJISC)*, 02(1), 27–60. <https://doi.org/10.62976/ajisc.v2i1.1368>
- Jamhari & Testriono. (2021). The Roots of Indonesia's Resilience Against Violent Extremism. *Studi Islamika*, 28(3), 517–545.
- Lundgren, L. (2023). *The State and Religious Minorities in Sweden* (Firsth). Springer International Publishing.
- Millie, J. (2008). Spiritual Meal' or Ongoing Project? The Dilemma of Dakwah Oratory. In S. Fealy, Greg and White (Ed.), *Expressing Islam: religious life and politics in Indonesia* (pp. 80–94). ISEAS Publishing.
- Ricklefs, M. C. (2008). Religion, Politics and Social Dynamics in Java: Historical and Contemporary Rhymes. In *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (pp. 115–136). ISEAS Publishing.
- Rochmawati, N. A. (2024). Nahdlatul Ulama dan Program Moderasi Beragama. *International Conference on Muslim Society and Thought: "Re-Centering Islamic Studies: Contemporary Discourses between Revealed Knowledge and Social Sciences."* <https://doi.org/10.15642/ICMUST.2024.4.1750>
- Saat, N. (2020). Mainstreaming Alternative Islamic Voices in Malaysia. In Norshahril Saat & Azhar Ibrahim (Ed.), *Alternative voices in Muslim Southeast Asia : discourse & struggles* (pp. 118–138). ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Sebastian, L. C. A. N. (2019). The " Conservative Turn " in Indonesian Islam Implications for the 2019 Presidential Elections. In *Center For Asian Studies* (Number March). Center for Asian Studies.
- Tempo.co. (2023, December). Sebagian Benar, Aset Muhammadiyah Diperkirakan Senilai Rp 400 Triliun Berupa Tanah dan Bangunan. *Tempo.Co*.
- Ubaidillah, Nizam & Syalafiyah, N. (2025). Pembubaran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Perspektif Fiqh Siyasah Dusturiyah. *Islamic Law: Jurnal Siyasah*, 10(1), 139–154.
- White, Sally & Anshor, M. U. (2008). Islam and Gender in Contemporary Indonesia: Public Discourses on Duties, Rights and Morality. In Greg Fealy & Sally White (Ed.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (pp. 137–158). ISEAS Publishing.